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What is IV&V?
• Verification
– Are we building the system right?
• Validation
– Are we building the right system?
• Independent
– IEEE Standard for System and Software Verification, IEEE 
1012, defines three important criteria for IV&V 
independence
• Technical Independence - Different personnel; not the 
same people who build it
• Managerial Independence - Planning and scoping 
control.  Independent reporting path
• Financial Independence - Funding from a source 
separate from project development
Origins of IV&V within NASA
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• NASA's IV&V Program: established in 1993 
• Founded under the NASA Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance (OSMA) as a direct result of recommendations 
made by the National Research Council (NRC) and 
the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space 
Shuttle Challenger Accident.
4Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
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Agency Budget Structure
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IV&V Program budget covers all IV&V Program needs, including technical 
work, physical and IT infrastructure, security, etc.
Benefits of IV&V
• Increased Safety and Dependability - Greater confidence-delivered products 
are error free and meet user needs. Many IV&V-identified defects threaten 
loss of mission or loss of crew if not resolved
• Reduced Risk - Increased likelihood high-risk errors are detected early, 
allowing time for the development team to evolve a comprehensive solution 
rather than a forced makeshift fix to accommodate deadlines
• Greater Management Insight - Increased insight into project status and 
performance through independent perspective and objective evidence
• Reduced Cost - Reduced development rework, reducing total program and 
project costs for a positive return on investment
• More Knowledge Transfer – Increased communication across project teams 
and cross-project transfer of system and software engineering best practices
IV&V is an industry-proven approach to increase quality, reduce risk, gain 
development insight, reduce cost, and transfer knowledge
NASA’s IV&V Approach
• Full Lifecycle - Not just testing at the end. For NASA, IV&V starts near Mission 
SRR, continues up to, and sometimes beyond, launch
• Product Focused – Not document or compliance focused. Examines concept, 
architecture, requirements, design, code, and test products
• Capability Based Assurance (CBA) – Keeping the “big picture” in view when 
assessing the software details
• Follow the Risk – Dynamically adapting plans to focus assurance activities 
where evidence indicates there is risk
• Use Multiple Perspectives for Analyses
Add assurance the software will do what it is supposed to do
Add assurance the software will not do what it is not supposed to do
Add assurance the software will respond appropriately under adverse conditions
NASA IV&V is a systems engineering process employing rigorous 
methodologies for evaluating the correctness and quality of software 
products throughout the SDLC for NASA’s highest profile missions.
9IV&V Assurance Strategy: Concept
• The IV&V Assurance Strategy is the identification/selection of 
• Which mission capability and system software risk to target
• Which IV&V techniques to use to help reduce the targeted risk
• IV&V techniques include assessments, analyses, evaluations, 
reviews, inspections, and testing of software artifacts during the 
entire development lifecycle that create evidence
• Aligned with IEEE 1012
• Documented in a Catalog of Methods
• How much evidence?  it is a trade-off between criticality of the system(s) 
being acquired/deployed
– Life-sustaining subsystems would warrant an evidence package that clearly & 
objectively shows the software will operate safely (or clearly shows that it won’t) 
– Data management subsystems may warrant less of an evidence package 
• The amount and type of evidence needed determines the rigor of the 
analysis
– Analytical Rigor is the type and amount of IV&V techniques to use
How IV&V Uses Evidence
• Support recommendations for the developers 
that improve the quality (or reliability) of the 
system software
• Support assurance conclusions about the 
quality (or reliability) of the system software
• Adjust the IV&V Assurance Strategy to focus 
on the most critical software
• Gain insight into the progress of development
• Evaluate thoroughness of analysis
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Establishing an IV&V Assurance Strategy
• The IV&V Program assesses a mission system to determine:
– The inherent risk associated with the system capabilities
– The role of software in those capabilities 
– Which software elements of the system warrant IV&V analysis
– Software elements are generally the focal point of IV&V analyses; however, 
other lifecycle artifacts (for example: concept documentation, system design, 
etc…) are utilized to inform lower-level analyses
• The IV&V Program’s process for this assessment is called 
“Portfolio Based Risk Assessment” (PBRA)
– Results in scores for impact (a measure of the effect of a problem) and likelihood 
(the potential for the existence of errors) for each system capability and software 
element
– Enables informed decision making regarding:
– What parts of the system should IV&V work on
– What analytical rigor should IV&V apply (for example: dynamic analysis 
should be conducted to thoroughly test the implementation of the protocol 
used for communications)
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Establishing an IV&V Assurance Strategy
(continued)
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3
Subsystem 1 – do not recommend IV&V
Subsystem 2 – recommend IV&V utilizing Static Analysis
Subsystem 3 – recommend IV&V utilizing Dynamic Analysis
Subsystem n … 
SMEs conduct formal 
or informal inspections &
evidence is recorded simply
as issues
SMEs apply formalisms
& mathematical rigor
to prove existence or
absence of critical
properties
Manual Analysis
Amount of Rigor & Evidence Needed
Formal AnalysisStatic Analysis Dynamic Analysis
SMEs evaluate structure
& content using various
perspectives supported 
by CASE tools.  Evidence is
recorded as issues & 
supplemented with coverage
SMEs execute system & 
evaluate results.  Evidence is
recorded more thoroughly as
to make the case for what
works and what are limitations
less more
1 2 3
Subsystem Criticality Profile
Implementing an IV&V Assurance Strategy
• An IV&V Assurance Strategy is implemented by a set of Analysis 
Activities
– Each Analysis Activity achieves one or more IV&V Project’s 
Assurance Objective
– The IV&V Assurance Strategy informs the Technical Reference and 
which IV&V technique to use
– An Analysis Activity generates the evidence for a specific 
Assurance Objective
• Possible outcomes of implementing the IV&V Assurance 
Strategy
– Assurance Conclusions at varying levels of confidence and that that 
are based on evidence from analyses performed
– Findings or defects:  “Issues”, a.k.a “TIM”s (Technical Issue 
Memorandum)
– Candidate technical risks for adoption by the Program or Project
– Refinement of the technical reference
– Refinement of IV&V Assurance Strategy
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IV&V Assurance Strategy 
Implementation Process and Example
1. Risk-Prioritize System Capabilities and Software 
for Assurance using PBRA/RBA and IVV S3106, 
and Develop High-Level Assurance Objectives 
(AOs)
Capability: Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL)
Entity: Orion Timeline Vehicle Manager (TVM)
Objective: Assure TVM correctly evaluates and 
detects critical events, to mitigate risk of 
inappropriate or missed event detection
2. Formulate Risk-Driven Assurance Design in Technical Scope 
and Rigor (TS&R), and Select and Tailor Analysis Methods 
using COMPASS and IVV 09-1
Plan: M-38, Verify Software Design by Inspecting Traces 
to Requirements (Nominal, Off-Nominal, and Hazard 
Scenarios)3. Develop IV&V Technical Reference, 
Studying Artifacts and Collaborating 
with Developers and IV&V Team to 
Identify IV&V Questions/Concerns to 
“Follow the Risk”
Learn and Understand: IV&V created a flow diagram 
to model condition evaluation and event detection 
behavior, start to finish, capturing timing, data 
paths, and interfaces.
4. Execute Planned Analysis: IV&V traced  expectations to TVM 
software and searched for answers to IV&V Questions/Concerns. 
IV&V noted differences in comparison logic between code methods 
intended to provide the same behavior, in critical event condition 
detection code.  
5. Confirm Potential Issues: IV&V  analyzed the logic and proved the 
code incorrect in 8 separate instances. 
6. Evaluate Issue Significance and Document Issues: The incorrect code would have resulted in incorrect 
evaluation and detection of critical events, plausibly leading to Loss of Mission (LOM) during EDL, which relies 
significantly on event-driven behavior (Severity 1).
7. Communicate Issue and Track to Resolution: Orion accepted and resolved this significant issue.
Condition Equivalent
|x| < y (x < y) AND NOT (x <= -y)
IV&V Technical Reference
Incorrect Code in Critical Software Method
IV&V Communication Methods
• Interact with Program and Project staff in working 
group meetings to establish system understanding and 
communicate IV&V focus and status
• Communicate findings as soon as possible directly to 
the developer (e.g. during peer reviews of artifacts or 
software hosted by the Program, Projects or providers)
• Deliver reports at the completion of major work 
activities that summarize analysis approaches and 
results
• Communicate status of assurance objectives and 
summaries of assurance conclusions in presentations 
at Program and Project milestone reviews
• Communicate value of IV&V accomplishments in the 
IV&V Program’s weekly reports and monthly status 
reviews to the Agency
Status of Gateway IV&V
• First round of prioritizing the expected Gateway 
system capabilities and software and developing 
high-level Assurance Objectives (AOs) is complete 
and under internal review within the Program
– Plan is to review results of the assessment with the 
Gateway Program and Module Projects
• Finalizing a risk-driven strategy to accomplish the 
assurance objectives that leverages the IV&V 
Program’s technical framework and applies 
appropriate analytical rigor
• Developing the IV&V team
• Supporting the Gateway Program’s efforts to 
certify Core Flight Software (CFS) for Gateway
Gateway IV&V Next Steps
• Continue to support CFS certification effort
• Finalize the initial Gateway IV&V Project Execution Plan 
(IPEP)
– Identify which Assurance Objectives (AOs) to target and what 
techniques to use (e.g. exploring option to use formal methods 
for some AOs like those for assuring autonomous behavior)
– Review the IPEP with the Gateway Program
• Begin executing according to the IPEP
– Plan analysis activities that targets integrated Gateway system 
and software artifacts and Gateway module system and software 
artifacts as they mature and become available
– Develop technical references in SysML for analysis activities by 
studying Gateway artifacts and collaborating with Program and 
Project staff to identify questions/concerns to target analysis (i.e. 
“Follow the Risk”)
– Develop plan for establishing an independent Gateway VSM  
and software test capability for the Gateway IV&V Project
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IV&V’s Goal is Mission Success
For More Information
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/ivv/program_flyers.html
QUESTIONS?
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IV&V Program Services
The IV&V Program’s mission is to provide our customers assurance that their 
safety and mission-critical software will operate reliably and safely.
• System and Software Assurance
– Full Lifecycle IV&V
– Independent Assessments
• Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Support
– Common support infrastructure for assuring core Software Assurance functions 
across the Agency 
– Software Assurance Research Program (SARP)
• Mission Protection Services (MPS)
– Cybersecurity Threat/Risk Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment, Information 
Assurance (IA) Support, CyberLab, FedRAMP
• Jon McBride Software Testing And Research (JSTAR) Laboratory
– Independent Test Capability (ITC), Robotics
• Simulation, Testing, Automation, and Virtualization
• Partnerships, Collaboration, and Leadership
– MDA, International IV&V WG, WVANG, DOE, OSMA, FBI, NOAA, DOD/Army, 
CCSDS, OCIO, OCE, STF-1, GSFC Code 300, 400, 500, 700, 800
• STEM Engagement
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… by getting involved early in the SW development lifecycle
13 of 13 active IV&V projects started before mission SRR.     
… by detecting defects in-phase with SW development
Overall phase containment by active projects:  92% over the past year.  
… by detecting and submitting quality defects to the development teams
Overall issue acceptance for active projects was 95% over the past year.
How do IV&V Projects provide the most value to the Agency?
… by ensuring our customers are satisfied with our products and services
ACTUAL:  2018 Annual Survey:  99.7% of all responses indicated a favorable (“Agree” 
or “Strongly Agree”) perception of the support being provided by the IV&V Program.  
NASA IV&V Project Metrics
